
## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA DIVISION TWO



THE STATE OF ARIZONA,		)	
		)	2 CA-CR 2006-0201
	Appellee,	)	DEPARTMENT B
		)	
v.		)	MEMORANDUM DECISION
		)	Not for Publication
AARON JAMERSON,		)	Rule 111, Rules of
		)	the Supreme Court
	Appellant.	)	-
		)	

## APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PINAL COUNTY

Cause No. CR200501852

Honorable Kevin D. White, Judge

## **AFFIRMED**

Harriette P. Levitt

Tucson Attorney for Appellant

E C K E R S T R O M, Presiding Judge.

After a jury trial, appellant Aaron Jamerson was convicted of theft of a means of transportation, a class three felony. Jamerson admitted having two prior felony convictions, and the trial court imposed an exceptionally mitigated, 7.5-year term of imprisonment with credit for 218 days' presentence incarceration. Counsel has filed a brief citing *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967); *State v. Leon*, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969); and *State v. Clark*, 196 Ariz. 530, 2 P.3d 89 (App. 1999), stating

that she has thoroughly reviewed the record without finding any arguable issues to raise on appeal. Counsel has complied with *Clark* by "setting forth a detailed factual and procedural history of the case with citations to the record, [so] this court can satisfy itself that counsel has in fact thoroughly reviewed the record." 196 Ariz. 530, ¶ 32, 2 P.3d at 97. Counsel asks us to search the record for error pursuant to *Anders*. Jamerson has not filed a supplemental brief. We affirm.

 $\P 2$ Viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, see State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 246, ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 914, 914 (App. 1999), the evidence at trial established that the victim, B., owned a red motorcycle that he had used for transportation in the months prior to its being stolen. Upon realizing one morning that the motorcycle was missing, B. called the police, who followed a set of footprints and drag marks that appeared to have come from a "heavy object . . . something in a locked position" that led from B.'s house to Jamerson's home. Because it had rained the night before, it was clear that the marks in the wet, muddy ground were fresh. Officers located muddy, wet shoes just inside the door of Jamerson's house, which Jamerson identified as belonging to him, although he told the officers he had lent his shoes to someone else the night before, when the motorcycle had been stolen. Jamerson, who was wearing shorts at the time, had mud splatters on his lower legs. A police officer testified that one of the two sets of footprints leading from B.'s house to Jamerson's matched Jamerson's shoes. The officers found pieces of a red fender and a broken locking mechanism in the back of Jamerson's house, which B. later identified as parts of his motorcycle.

$\P 3$	Jamerson voluntarily told the officers that B.'s motorcycle was "on the side
of [his brothe	er's] house," that the theft of the motorcycle had been planned for a month, and
that a friend	of his brother's had wanted to purchase it. Although the officers did not find
the motorcyc	cle at Jamerson's brother's house, B. recovered it the next day at a location
about five mi	les away. It was missing the front fender, the steering lock, and the battery, and
a tire was fla	tt. B. testified he had not given anyone, including Jamerson, permission to use
the motorcy	cle. This evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict. See A.R.S. § 13-
1814(A)(1). <sup>1</sup>	

¶4 We have searched the entire record and have found no fundamental error.

Accordingly, we affirm Jamerson's conviction and sentence.

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	PETER J. ECKERSTROM, Presiding Judge
CONCURRING:	
J. WILLIAM BRAMMER, JR., Judge	. <u></u>

PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Judge

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Section 13-1814(A)(1), A.R.S., provides: "A person commits theft of means of transportation if, without lawful authority, the person knowingly . . . [c]ontrols another person's means of transportation with the intent to permanently deprive the person of the means of transportation."